From Olsen Financial Studies data on the Euro-Dollar currency pair (2008)(2009)(2010), we conduct a time-series analysis to explain the role of trading volume on exchange rate volatility (Mixture Distribution Hypothesis), taking into account non-linearity. We find evidence that the MDH holds in turbulent periods, during which spreads and volume trading are high. When spreads and the volume are high, the relationship between trading volume and volatility tends to increase. Linking this result with the Tobin tax debate implies that a Tobin tax would be effective for curbing speculation and reducing exchange rate volatility, even in turbulent periods. This paper provides the first empirical corroboration of this proposition and seems to confirm some previous theoretical papers in the vein of Tobin. All in all, two main results emerged. First, the abundant literature on the MDH, but exclusively based on linear econometrics, should take into account non-linearities. Second, the effect of a Tobin tax on volatility would be slightly context-dependent and always negative. A Tobin tax would have been stabilizing and effective in the 2008 crisis when spreads, volume and volatility were very high.
Introduction
The economic downturn following the sub-prime crisis and the recent sovereign debt crisis has led to renewed interest in a Tobin tax. Such a tax is viewed as a possible way of dampening down the deficits of the industrialized countries. Last September, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel floated the idea of a European tax on financial transactions. The main reason for such a taxation project is that a Tobin tax can generate large revenues. However, the original purpose of the so-called Tobin tax was not to produce revenue for industrialized countries but to stabilize exchange rates.
In 1972, during the Janeway Lectures at Princeton, James Tobin suggested putting "some sand in the wheels of international finance" by imposing a tax on all foreign exchange transactions. The first aim of his proposal was to preserve and strengthen the autonomy of national monetary policies in the early 1970s, following the decision by the U.S. government to come off the gold standard and introduce floating exchange rates. As Tobin wrote:
"monetary policy becomes, under floating rates, exchange rate policy" [1978, p. 156 ]. The second aim was to reduce foreign exchange rate and financial volatility. Tobin's underlying thinking (see Tobin [1974 Tobin [ , 1978 Tobin [ , 1984 Tobin [ , 1996 ) was that short term round-trip transactions (for instance, speculative transactions) are more destabilizing than long-term transactions. This idea had first been put forward by Keynes [1936] in his metaphor of the "beauty contest". This notion of harmful volatility created by speculative trading contrasts with the position taken by Friedman [1953] , who argued that speculation is in general not destabilizing but, on the contrary, helps stabilize prices. Tobin suggested that a tax would reduce volatility by discouraging short-term transactions (thereby curbing destabilizing speculative trading) to a greater extent than long-term transactions (and investments) and thus crowding out speculators and noise traders from foreign exchange markets (Forex hereafter) in favor of fundamentalists and long-term investors.
However, this argument has been challenged by both proponents and opponents of the tax 3 . There are two main objections to it. First, not all short-term transactions are speculative, but may be the result of the "hot potato" phenomenon (see, for instance, Lyons [2001] ).
Consequently the large daily turnover of Forex ($4.0 trillion, BIS [2010] ) would not only reflect speculative behavior but liquidity and risk-sharing behavior. Second, the Tobin tax is an indiscriminate tax and would penalize not only destabilizing transactions but also transactions that provide liquidity and information. Therefore, by crowding out short-term transactions, a tax would be counterproductive. Indeed, by reducing the liquidity of Forex and the financial markets, it would increase volatility. In fact, as underlined by Davidson [1997] , Bianconi et al. [2009] and Hanke et al. [2010] , a liquidity market is likely to be more stable than a thin market.
In this paper, we seek to assess the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility. In other words, we try to see whether a reduced volume of transactions might have a destabilizing or a stabilizing effect. To this end, we examine two empirical relationships. On the one hand, we look at the influence of a tax on trading volume on the assumption that the tax increases spreads. On the other, we assess the relationship between trading volume and Forex volatility given the expected decrease in the trading volume subsequent to the tax. The reason for examining the relationship between trading volume and volatility comes from Mixture Distribution Hypothesis (MDH) studies. This literature posits that price volatility and trading volume dynamics are both coordinated by the same information arrival rate. This question is initially not connected to our research problematic, but by evaluating the relationship between trading volume and volatility, we can derive some policy recommendations concerning the functioning modalities of a Tobin tax. Since the tax will necessarily lead to a reduction in the trading volume, if we can assess the impact of the volume on volatility, we will then shed some light on the Tobin tax debate in regard to its impact on exchange rate volatility.
The main distinctive feature of our analysis is the application of the MDH literature to the Tobin tax debate. Indeed, the MDH literature has not addressed the issue of instituting a Tobin tax. Another distinctive feature of our work is the non-linear environment we used.
While previous studies in the MDH literature have empirically examined the link between trading volume and volatility in foreign exchange transactions, none of them has addressed the issue of regime switching. Our intuition is that regime-switching models describe this In other words, based on smoothed threshold regression models (STR), the main research questions tackled in this paper are the following. What is the effect of a Tobin tax on exchange rate volatility? Is this effect uniformly distributed across the different Forex regimes (high appreciation of the Euro, low volume trading, the financial crisis, etc.)? What policy recommendations can be derived as a consequence?
The paper makes two important contributions. First, we show that the MDH -i.e. the positive relationship between volume and volatility -depends on the level of the volume trading and to a lesser extent on the level of cost transactions (spreads), and that it holds in both "normal" and "turbulent" times. In addition, we find evidence of an increasing mixture distribution in turbulent times with high volume and spreads, as in the crisis of autumn 2008.
The paper thus challenges the MDH literature based only on linear frameworks. Second, our results enable us to assess the stabilizing effect of a Tobin tax on exchange rate volatility. A Tobin tax could decrease volatility by crowding out noise traders, chartists and speculators, as proposed by advocates of the tax. This effect is, however, more pronounced in "turbulent periods" than in "normal times", that is, when the volume of trading increases. In other words, a Tobin tax would be more effective in turbulent periods, when the number of speculators is very high, as expected by Tobin [1974] . Moreover, a Tobin tax would have been stabilizing in the 2008 crisis when spreads, volume and volatility were very high.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the theoretical and empirical literature assessing the link between a Tobin tax and volatility. Section 3 introduces the methodology used. Section 4 deals with the empirical results. Section 5 expounds the policy implications of our results in regard to introducing a Tobin tax on Forex transactions. of traders in the foreign exchange market, but they assume that the relative proportion of noise traders already present in Forex affects the overall benefit of entry differently for informed traders than for noise traders. Indeed, intuitively, informed traders need to take the relative noise component into consideration when forming rational expectations, while noise 5 Palley [1999] also used a microeconomic model, but he assumed two groups of risk-neutral traders (fundamentalists and speculators). As a result, a Tobin tax would increase market efficiency by reducing the noise trading component of the market. Moreover, although a Tobin tax would hit both kinds of traders, speculators would be affected more as a result of their higher trading frequency. 6 Noise traders are a type of misinformed traders because they perceive only the second moment of the excess return correctly.
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Theoretical studies
traders do not. When they introduce a Tobin tax which interacts with existing entry costs (that is, the spreads in practice), they find a very interesting result that it may not necessarily lead to a decrease in the relative noise component and may be ineffective in reducing volatility. In fact, three possible equilibria are derived. In the first equilibrium, there are the same number of noise and informed traders entering the market, so the introduction of a Tobin tax leads them to exit the market in pairs. Since the tax does not influence the composition of traders, it only reduces liquidity without changing volatility. In the second equilibrium, the tax affects the composition of traders, but the burden of the increasing transaction costs due to the new taxation is heavier for informed traders than for noise traders. Intuitively, the tax will discourage the entry of both types of traders, but the exit of traders will have a relatively positive externality on the overall entry benefits for noise traders. Indeed, the exit of informed traders increases the relative noise component, which in turn increases the entry benefit for all traders. Consequently, aggregate volatility increases and the Tobin tax turns out to be ineffective. In the third equilibrium, Shi and Xu [2009] argue that the entry cost is sufficiently high to prevent the entry of noise traders. Thus the composition of the market as well as volatility are unchanged after introducing the tax.
In the last decade, another set of studies have attempted to examine the impact of a would have an impact on volatility. More interestingly, they have shown that the impact of a tax on volatility is highly dependent on the size of the market. Thus, the effect of a tax would be much stronger in a thin market than in a liquidity market. It follows that a tax can reduce exchange rate volatility only if the rate of composition of traders is slow.
Empirical studies
Empirical research on the effects of a Tobin tax on Forex volatility is quite sparse. As All in all, existing studies are limited in number and suffer from various shortcomings.
Since time series data on current trading volume and bid/ask prices are very difficult to collect (the market is highly decentralized), Aliber et al. [2003] used futures data as a proxy, since they are traded on a centralized market and are easily available. However, the turnover of foreign exchange futures is only 3% of total Forex turnover and is less liquid. Lanne and Vesala [2010] did not use futures data, but followed Andersen and Bollerslev. Unfortunately, their data set is somewhat obsolete (1992) (1993) . Furthermore, all these studies assume that the relationship between the tax and volatility is linear, whatever the liquidity and the economic environment. We, on the other hand, would intuitively surmise that the relationship is by no means uniform. 12 A Tobin tax can be regarded as an increase in transaction tax (see for instance Mende and Menkhoff [2003] ).
Methodology
Tobin tax, trading volume and volatility
Previous empirical studies have examined the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility by focusing only on the volatility/spread relationship. In contrast, in this paper we concentrate on the link between volatility and trading volume, and for two main reasons. First, some studies (see, for instance, Demos and Goodhart [1996] ) have emphasized the existence of two-way causality between volatility and spread, thereby giving rise to an endogeneity problem that must be taken into account to evaluate without bias the relationship between volume and volatility in the foreign exchange market. Although GMM estimators provide an interesting alternative to this problem (see Hartmann [1999] for instance), it is nonetheless the case that it is difficult to acquire the right instruments. On the contrary, when we focus on the relationship between volume and volatility, it is reasonable to view volume as weakly exogenous. Furthermore, it is easier to understand the transmission channels running from the Tobin tax to volatility in this context. Theoretical studies of the effects of a Tobin tax on volatility have show that this effect is conditional on the size and depth of the market as well as on the structure of the transaction volume.
Hence our analysis of the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility may be broken down as follows.
Tobin tax → Volume → Volatility
From an econometric point of view, two different relationships need to be estimated: In the second step, equation (2) postulates the impact of the trading volume on volatility, and is based on the Mixture Distribution Hypothesis (MDH) literature. In this equation, volume is thus considered as an exogenous variable. As a consequence, given the decrease in trading volume after the introduction of a Tobin tax (equation (1)), we are able to assess the impact of the trading volume on exchange rate volatility. In line with the MDH literature, we expect a positive sign for the 2  coefficient, at least in "normal times". In other words, a decreasing volume following the introduction of the Tobin tax would lead to a decrease in exchange rate volatility.
In the remainder of the paper, we re-estimate equation (1) and find 2  negative. Given 2  negative, we estimate equation (2) using non-linear methods for the first time. First though,
we focus on the MDH literature and the econometric methods we used.
Mixture Distribution Hypothesis
We assess the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility by focusing on the volatility/volume relationship, which has been extensively analyzed in the Mixture Distribution Hypothesis One study, however, is in line with our non-linearity intuition. Using Forex data from BIS and carrying out rolling regressions for seven emerging countries (January 1999 to July 1999), Galati [2000] found that the positive link between volume and volatility -in other words, between information arrival and volatility -is different in times of severe market stress compared to normal periods. In times of stress, the link between volatility and volume becomes negative. A more recent contribution by Mougoué and Aggarwal [2011] , that allows for non-linearities by assessing the relationship between trading volume and volatility for three major currency futures contracts (the British Pound, the Canadian Dollar and the Japanese Yen), finds no confirming evidence for the MDH. More specifically, they carry out linear and non-linear Granger causality tests to reveal strong significant two-way non-linear causality between return volatility and trading volume as a consequence of the heterogeneity of beliefs among traders regarding new information in foreign exchange markets.
Smooth Transition Regression modeling
We now detail further the econometric method we used to estimate the model (2 We assumed that the transition function is a general logistic function: 
Application to the Euro-Dollar and to the Euro-Yen currency pairs
To assess the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility, we revisit the MDH in a non-linear 
Empirical analysis
Estimation of the currency transaction tax elasticity
Our analysis focuses on the Euro/Dollar currency pair. We use daily data from 1
October 2008 until 1 October 2010 and we use two main variables: volume and spread. The volatility variable is also included in our analysis since volatility has an influence on the trading volume (see, for instance, Demos and Goodhart [1996] ). The underlying idea is that turbulent or instable periods with high volatility level can reduce the trading volume. Both volume and spread are expressed in logarithmic form to directly obtain the coefficient as an elasticity. Consequently, it is possible to directly read the impact of a Tobin tax -equivalent to an increase in the spread -on the trading volume through the estimated elasticity.
In line with equation (1) 
.
Note that the variable 1 t volume  is needed to take into account the first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. In addition, all the variables are stationary 16 , and so we are not exposed to the "spurious regression" issue identified by Yule and outlined by Phillips [1986] .
For comparison purposes, we first estimate equation (5) Furthermore, the impact of volatility is significantly positive in accordance with the Mixture Distribution Hypothesis we further develop.
The divergence between our results and the previous studies could be explained by the fact that these regressions were based on daily data and on a two-year sample, whereas Bismans and Damette [2008] used intraday data for two days in November 2004 only. We think it likely that the previous estimations capture more microstructural effects than our new estimations, and this increases the magnitude of the spread effect. Moreover, the estimation in Table 1 does not take into account the probable endogeneity of the spread.
To address those issues, and in line with the previous studies from Demos and 
The first equation is our equation of interest and is similar to equation (5) previously estimated; it captures the elasticity of the volume with respect to the spread, whereas the second equation focuses on the effect of the trading volume on the spread in line with, at least 16 We conducted Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and DF-GLS unit root tests and the stationarity KPSS test. Results of these tests are not reproduced here in order to save space, but are available upon request. 17 The results are very similar if we do not take into account this effect. 18 Breusch-Godfrey LM test (with an AR (2) Since diagnostic tests reveal the presence of heteroskedasticity in the system (especially in the first equation), we compute the GMM-3SLS (Generalized Method of Moments -Three-Stage Least Squares) estimator. Indeed, unlike the standard 3SLS method, which is a restricted version of the simultaneous equation GMM model, the GMM-3SLS estimator allows for heteroskedasticity in addition to cross correlation. It is besides consistent and efficient without any assumptions about the functional form of the errors terms.
The GMM-3SLS method combines a first estimation with instrumental variables in keeping with 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares) to obtain consistent estimators and a second estimation by GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) to address the problem of correlated error terms (see Zellner and Theil [1962] ) and heteroskedasticity using the efficient weighting matrix.
Overall, we follow a three-step method. The first two involve estimating each equation of the system individually by 2SLS and the third involves estimating the previous estimated equations (by 2SLS) by GMM. The results of the GMM-3SLS estimations are presented in Table 2 below. Note also that the J test of overidentifying restrictions is conducted to check the identification of the model. 20 As underlined by Wooldridge (2010), the most important weakness of 3SLS estimators is that, if one equation in the system is mispecified, all parameters estimates become inconsistent because parameters are estimated for the whole system and not for each equation. To check the specification of our system, we first refer to the literature (Demos and Goodhart [1996] for instance) and second, we compute for comparisons purposes traditional 2SLS and 3SLS methods (available upon request). Since the parameters estimates are very similar in both estimations, we can conclude that the simultaneous equations model is correctly specified. For instance, the tax elasticity is equal to -0.27 in both estimations. Note : The set of instruments 22 includes constant and lagged values of the explanatory variables in the different equations : spread(-2) to spread (-6), volatility (-1) to volatility (-6), volume(-6).
The table 2 outlines that the elasticity is higher in GMM than in the previous OLS estimates (now -0.30). Furthermore, all the lagged volume coefficients are significant at a 10% level significance. In addition, the impact of volatility on volume is no longer statistically significant. This last result is important because it is in accordance with our previous assumption that 1,t  and 2,t  are not correlated errors terms in the system of equations (1)- (2) and that the volume can be considered as exogenous in the MDH relationship (equation (4)). 21 We use the Breusch-Godfrey LM test (with an AR (2) To detect non-linear patterns in equation (4), we carry out the LM-linearity test discussed in Teräsvirta [1994, 1998 ]. In the same way as in other non-linear models 23 : 0
An estimation of the MDH in a non-linear framework
Testing linearity and choosing the appropriate STR model
If the 03 H hypothesis yields the strongest rejection, then the LSTR2 model should be chosen.
In all other cases, LSTR1 is the most appropriate. 23 See Hansen [1996] for a detailed discussion of this issue. The symbol -refers to a singularity matrix problem. We choose one lag for volatility; with two lags, only the model with the lagged volume as a transition variable remains non-linear.
Euro/Dollar results
Given the previous linearity and specification tests, we estimate the corresponding LSTR1 models (p,q) models are estimated with p and q denote respectively the lag length of the endogenous and exogenous variables. Note that all variables are I(0) 24 . Under the assumption of exogenous covariates, the estimation method is nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood under the assumption of normally distributed errors. As explained by Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared coefficient is higher in specification (2): 0.17 as against 0.12.
Regarding Table 5 . We suggest that the number of short-term operations also increases during this period.
When volatility increases, then a vicious circle comes into operation: the number of speculators will be higher, since they take advantage of the variability in order to speculate.
Note that in the Jeanne and Rose model, the impact of noise traders in equilibrium is nonmonotonic because noise traders have two counteracting roles: they both create and share risk at the same time. Excess variance is thus a function of the number of noise traders. 
Euro/Yen results
We Table 6 ). Hence, when the trading volume exceeds its threshold estimated at 12.77, the model gradually moves from a linear to a non-linear regime, thus strengthening the MDH. Note, however, that the gamma coefficient is not significant at a 10% significance level, which puts the thrust of our results into perspective.
It is apparent from Chart 3 that the model detects very similar non-linear periods to the Euro/Dollar case previously analyzed, thereby providing evidence of a strong common and simultaneous dynamic between different foreign exchange markets, whatever the currency pairs traded. However, when we compare the Euro/Yen case with the Euro/Dollar, the trading volume is less frequently above its threshold value. Moreover, the frequency of observations in the non-linear regime is very low for the last 30 observations, i.e. when the trading volume drops, whereas in the Euro/Dollar case the trading volume was consistently above its threshold for this period. This time, the estimations with spread as a transition variable are significant (second column of Table 4 ). The coefficient of the volume is not significant in the linear regime, thus the MDH does not hold in this regime. By contrast, in the non-linear part of the model -when the spread exceeds its estimated threshold value -the coefficient linked to the MDH is 26 The results with two lagged volatility are very similar and are available upon request. 
Robustness checks: a GMM instrumental variables estimation
In order to check the robustness of our previous results, we estimate our STR model indicating an increased role of the information on the volatility dynamics.
To check the robustness of these results, we tried to change the set of instruments, the initial conditions and the specification of the model (especially the lagged of the endogeneous variable). The qualitative properties of our results have remained consistent throughout all estimates. 27 Our GMM code has been programmed on the basis of the Ox code from R. Bruggemann [2011] . 
Policy implications for a Tobin tax
We can now interpret these results in relation to the debate around the effects of a Tobin tax on volatility. Our conclusion is that a tax would, on average, be an effective instrument for reducing exchange rate volatility, since the volatility/volume relationship is always positive, while the trading volume to the currency transaction tax elasticity is always This result chimes with Tobin's writings [1974, 1978] , which argue that the tax could reduce exchange rate volatility by discouraging destabilizing transactions, especially shortterm transactions, more than long-term investments; indeed, the burden of taxation would be higher for short-term transactions. It may be supposed that if the tax proves to be more effective in reducing volatility in periods of turbulence, as indicated by our analysis, it is because it discourages transactions creating instability in times of crisis. With reference to the an increase of the number of noise traders, who create volatility all the more so since they use volatility as a potential benefit 28 . A Tobin Tax could therefore be more effective in those periods where the number of noise traders is high, since they are more sensitive to taxation and therefore leave the market more easily than long-term investors.
One limitation to our analysis should, however, be addressed. It might be supposed that our findings -increasing mixture distribution in turbulent periods -could be biased if the trading volume is endogenous in times of crisis. In the theoretical analysis by Jeanne and
Rose [2002] , trading volume issuing from noise traders increasingly creates volatility as they progressively enter the market. But there is a feedback effect, since volatility acts as a benefit opportunity, which attracts all the more traders into the market. One can thus get a two-way causality between volume and volatility in turbulent times when the volume is high.
In the previous section, we test the robustness of our results by conducting GMM estimations of our LSTR model in order taking account endogeneity. To go further, we now implement
Granger causality tests for the Euro/Dollar currency pair (Table 8 [2010] of the study by Bloomfield et al. [2009] , who consider only one independent taxed market. A further study using panel data -with a large number of currency pairs from all the foreign exchange markets -would allow our results to be confirmed or disconfirmed once and for all. The statistical cost of such a study proves, however, to be high.
In any case, our results clearly differ from those of the two previous empirical studies in the case of a high tax rate of 1%. In other words, to sufficiently discourage speculators and short-termist noise traders, the decrease in the exchange rate should not exceed 20%.
However, in actual fact, during periods of speculative attacks, the decreases of the exchange rate can be much greater than 20%, a situation that makes Bird shows that a Tobin Tax is not a good instrument for warding off speculative attacks. He concludes, from a post-Keynesian analysis, that once the tax is unable to cover full amount of potential gains or losses, it is necessarily ineffective. Furthermore, the fact of reasoning in terms of annual yield rates is, in his opinion, misleading, for it allows one to imagine that the grains of sand of a low-rate tax can be transformed into massive paving stones when it is a matter of speculative flows. Jegourel and Kauffmann [2006] make a similar point: if the speculators do not annualize the cost of the tax, then the rate of taxation stays well below the depreciation levels normally expected in a crisis situation. For speculators, the depreciation therefore offers an opportunity for gain and to stay in the market and create volatility in spite of the tax.
Though we need to take into account these critical points, they are insufficient to invalidate our findings, since our reasoning is based on major currency pairs such as Euro/Dollar and not on emerging countries (as with Galati [2000] ). Moreover, the argument developed in this paper refers to the Euro/Dollar and Euro/Yen currency pairs over the 2008-2010 sample period, during which there was no currency crisis. Furthermore, according to our computations, the Euro/Dollar currency appreciated by some 51% on the 86-282 sample, before falling by about 22% over the 282-399 sample.
Finally, our results are incompatible with the two-tier rate tax proposed by Spahn [2002] . This author proposed implementing an adjustable tax consisting of a low-rate financial transactions tax in "normal times", plus an exchange surcharge at prohibitive rates as a piggyback in turbulent times to significantly discourage speculation. Our results suggest that such a tax would be unnecessary, since the decreasing trading volume generated by the tax would have more effect on volatility in turbulent periods than in normal periods.
Conclusion
This paper examined the role of trading volume on exchange rate volatility that is the so-called Mixture Distribution Hypothesis, taking into account non-linearity for the Euro/Dollar and the Euro/Yen currency pairs. Using STR models, we find evidence that the relationship between trading volume and volatility tends to increase in turbulent periods when spread and/or trading volume are at high levels. This is the first paper evaluating the state dependency in the MDH literature.
Linking this result with the Tobin tax debate implies that a Tobin tax would be effective for reducing exchange rate volatility, even in turbulent periods. This paper provides the first empirical corroboration of this proposition and seems to confirm some previous theoretical papers in the vein of Tobin concerning the effectiveness of such a measure. A Tobin tax would have been stabilizing and effective in the 2008 crisis when spreads, volume and volatility were very high.
